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does not purport to be comprehensive. The author realizes that his deci-
sion to deal with many large topics within the scope of one comparatively
short volume will cause some readers to be dissatisfied with the treatment
given to certain topics . He is in fact working on a larger jointly authored
book which he hopes .will appear within the next five or six years . Bearing
in mind the author's disclaimers, the reviewer nonetheless feels that there
are a few ways in which the present book could have been improved
without significantly increasing its length . As previously noted, more
emphasis should have been placed on the Optional Protocol to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . In addition, a short
discussion of the enforcement mechanismin the American Convention on
Human Rights would have served as further support for the author's
thesis that international human rights law can and should provide an
enforcement mechanism which can be activiated by an individual . Abrief
allusion to the law concerning the human rights of enemy aliens in war-
time might also have been interesting.
The physical production of the book is generally good, although.the
unfortunate location of the footnotes at the end of each chapter requires
the reader to relocate the relevant footnotes each time he begins a new
chapter. A more serious complaint is the method of cross-referencing .
For example, instead of giving a precise reference (e .g . "Supra p . 88"),
the cross-reference in footnote 11 on page 125 says, "See text at Chapter
V, note 39" . This method of cross-referencing may have allowed the
book to have been published more quickly, but it has done so at the
expense of the reader, who may need to refer to the table of contents in
order to locate a particular chapter .
Despite these minor cavils, Lillich's book is well worth reading by
anyone who is interested in the international law concerning the human
rights of aliens .
RUCE MCKINNON*
A Contract Modelfor Pollution Control. BYB . J. BARTON, R.T. FRANSON
AND A.R. THOMPSON. Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre,
University of British Columbia . 1984. Pp . 100. ($9 .50)
This book is about legal and administrative structures for the control of
pollution . It recommends, as the primary vehicle for pollution control, a
system of individual contracts between a provincial,government and pol-
luters, though the present system of permits and criminal sanctions would
*J . Bruce McKinnon, of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Van-
couver, British Columbia.
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still operate concurrently . The book recognizes that the current permit
system involves negotiation, and perhaps more negotiation than regula-
tion . The proposal would put this on a more structured footing by the
formal use of contracts and contract remedies .
The limitations of criminal sanctions are illustrated by the example
of a plant where new equipment has been installed at the request of
government, but contrary to expectations, it fails to achieve the required
reduction in contamination .' To prosecute in that situation would obvi-
ously be inappropriate . Prosecutions are also criticized as diverting atten-
tion to legal process and away from "solutions to the environmental
problem" .2 Other arguments against prosecutions can be encapsuled in
the policeman's rule-of-thumb that it's not crime if it's business .
The authors would retain criminal sanctions for situations of extreme
culpability, for example the secret dumping of toxic substances to avoid
controls, or the discharge of contaminants without even bothering to
negotiate a contract or obtain a permit ;3 but prosecutions would not other-
wise be used for the discharge of contamination in the course of business,
described in the book as "process pollution" .
In each contract, euphemistically to be called a "waste management
agreement", the province would agree not to prosecute or make statutory
orders except in limited circumstances. The model agreement suggested
in the book provides for the resolution of disputes by arbitration . s
The proposal, however, raises more difficulties than it would solve,
and the supporting arguments cannot withstand serious reflection . For
example, one deficiency in the use of criminal law is identified as the lack
of "moral guilt" . 6 Yet a large proportion (probably a majority) of the
population see "process pollution" as blameworthy, and the criminal
label could be a marginal influence on the proportion who see it that way .
To remove the implication of sin and substitute a contract regime could
encourage the perception of pollution as socially acceptable . Even if
prosecutions are unusable or unused, the preservation of a criminal law
regime can serve a range of purposes ; providing ammunition for conser-
vationists in public debate or in regulatory proceedings, promoting a
feeling among enforcement officials that they should do something about
the problem, adding weight to the government position in any negotia-
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Again, the authors see it as an advantage that "by using the contract
model, the tensions created by the criminal model are reduced" .' That
approach denies any role for confrontation in relation to "process pollu
tion" . Co-operative and confrontational approaches to pollution control
have each had their successes and their failures, and an optimum govern-
ment program will not rely on one of these to the exclusion of the other,
or otherwise exempt the vast area of "process pollution" from any con-
frontational response .
Of course the criminal process is plagued by enforcement problems,
but they would not be solved by switching to a contract model . For
example, one difficulty in prosecutions is the aversion of the courts to
strict liability and the reluctance ofjudges to recognize standard setting as
a role for legislators and regulators . Similar problems would arise with
the contract model. The draft bill in the book would permit liquidated
damages clauses, which would not be unenforceable as penalties,' but,
given the propensity of courts to want evidence of fault and loss (or at
least one of those two) before imposing significant sanctions, this would
not provide any improvement over the criminal process . Apprehension on
this point is enhanced by the authors' statement that "[a]nother incentive
which could be negotiated is a right to adjust the standards of effluent
downward if, for example, it is proven that the adjustment would cause
no harm to the environment" .9 One of the arguments raised in the first
place for avoiding the use of criminal law is the uncertainty of the signifi-
cance to the environment of many pollution situations .
Other problems would arise from the nature of the. contract and the
roles of the contracting parties. If one accepts theories about the domi-
nance of corporate power in governmental decision-making, 1° the con
tract would, to a substantial extent, be one negotiated between the pol-
luter and representatives ofpolluters. Even if one denies corporate dominance
in government, the result would be a bargain struck between an adjudica-
tor and one party (the polluter) while other parties (the polluted) are
absent . On either view, the structure would be biased in favour of pollu-
tion . The proposal seeks to mitigate this problem by allowing the public
an opportunity to object to pending agreements and to appeal to an envi-
ronmental appeal board. While that might alleviate the problem to some
extent, it would still leave representatives of the polluted (where they
exist) at a disadvantage, coming into the picture after the die has been
cast, and even then with limited resources .
7 P . 6 .
8 P . 73 .
9 P . 34 .
1° See, e.g ., (Corporate Power and Public Policy, Lecture by Professor S .
Osgoode Hall Law School, May 1985 .
Beck,
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Added to this, the authors want the contract to be voluntary." Surely
that is a complete abdication of government, bearing in mind that the
contract is made only with polluters and not with the polluted . The
authors argue that "[f]rom the perspective of the company it is clearly
more acceptable and therefore it is more likely to elicit co-operation . In
this way a more fitting and broadly accepted form of regulation is more
likely to be effective in accomplishing pollution abatement" . 12 This is
frighteningly close to the old plea for industry self-regulation. If human
health is to be protected from toxic hazards and the market economy is to
be protected from the externalization of cost, the solution must lie in
remedies that are less acceptable to polluters, not in remedies that are
more acceptable .
Another weakness of the proposal is that when dealing with major
industrial operations, no government could replicate the technical and
economic knowledge of the industry, and for that reason, as well as
possible apprehensions about the political power of the industry, govern-
ment officials would often not have a confident bargaining position .
Even if the proposed regime had some beneficial influence in the
reduction of contamination from existing sources, it would still have a
perverse influence on the generation of pollution from new sources . A
corporation creating a new activity causing a new discharge of pollution
into the environment would acquire a bargaining position in dealing with
government . This is also relevant to another concern. Would the proposal
increase the externalization of cost by increasing the use of public funds
for the control of pollution? There is an obvious risk that it would . Since a
reduction of pollution would be sought by bargaining, the existing level
might be perceived as having a legitimacy . Any reduction from that level
might be perceived as requiring the offer of something in return, and the
obvious quid pro quo would be taxpayers' money. The book enhances
that fear . A corporation that internalized the cost of its product by incur-
ring the capital cost of preventing pollution in the first place would obtain
no benefit from the bargaining process ; but a corporation that failed to
incur that capital cost and established its production in ways that pollute
the environment, thereby externalizing part of its cost, might then be able
to externalize its cost further by obtaining a subsidy. Indeed, the book
proposes that "[t]here could be inducements, including forms of subsidy,
offered to the company to accelerate an upgrading program", Is
As a check against non-enforcement, the book proposes that, as
under some present consumer protection legislation, the agency should be
required "to report to the Legislature each year concerning agreements
entered into and any enforcement activity . This is a practice that should
11 P. 28 .
12 P. 50 .
13 P. 45 .






provide an effective check against non-enforcement" . 14 Such reporting
mechanisms provide no check at all against non-enforcement . 15
A key argument for the contract model is that controls should be
site-specific . 16 That is obviously true of some pollution controls, but there
must also be requirements of general application. The proposal would
weaken pollution control by diverting from general to site-specific provis-
ions . The individual site response includes a propensity to accept that the
industry must operate, and any resulting pollution that cannot be reduced
within the economic options must be acceptable . Acquiescence may not
appear so logical or inevitable if the regulatory structure includes more
general requirements . Again, the emphasis on site-specific responses leaves
an incredible weakness in situations where downstream or downwind
interests are outside the jurisdiction .
This brings us to a further point. Pollution control is not simply a
matter of preserving the natural beauty of the environment from noxious
waste, nor is it a matter of balancing the prosperity of a local area against
damage to the environment in that area . Pollution includes discharges into
the workplace, into the atmosphere, into our drinking water and into our
food chain, of toxic substances with potentially deforming and lethal
effects on human life . As the Great Lakes become the toxic cesspools of
North America and even the peaks of the Rocky Mountains become
submerged in airborne contamination, a rational policy for survival requires
that each pollution source be assessed not merely for provable loss to
immediate downstream or downwind interests, but also for the contribu-
tion that it makes to the aggregate of continental and global pollution.
Any such policy for human survival requires broadscale and firmly entrenched
standards rather than reliance on site-specific negotiations in which the
political and economic pressures of the immediate time and place will
tend to prevail over the long-term continental and global interest in con-
trol over the aggregate .
Most problems with the proposal result from an initial choice of the
wrong model as a source of inspiration. The proposal in the book is based
on the undertakings which, in several jurisdictions, have become part of
the statutory framework of consumer protection . If there is any area of
law more firmly characterized by non-enforcement than pollution control
it is surely consumer protection . The use of that model is even harder to
defend in British Columbia where a more efficient system already oper-
ates for the enforcement of controls over in-plant pollution. Under the
Workers' Compensation Act of British Columbia, the Board can impose a
penalty assessment in respect of internat "pollution, thereby creating an
14 p. 38 .





THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol . 63
incentive to abatement . l ' If the political process favoured the serious
enforcement of pollution controls, a similar structure could be adopted for
external pollution . For example, there could be licensing with an escalat-
ing structure of fees varying according to the volume, quality and dura-
tion of the pollution. If the political process would enable such a fee
system to work, it could internalize cost and create incentives for the
prevention and abatement of pollution that would never arise under the
proposed contract model.
Finally, a disappointing feature of the book is the absence of any
political analysis . The power of polluters over the polluted in the political
process results not only from the natural advantage of corporate over
dissipated individual interests but also from the propensities of the politi-
cal process to prefer short-term over long-term interests, and to prefer
local over global interests. These realities are more determinative of
outcome than the choices of legal and administrative structures . It is,
nevertheless, surely incumbent upon any system designer to consider the
significance of his proposal in terms of its influence on the incidence of
political power in relation to pollution control .
A major polluter might find the book engaging, but this reviewer,
whose drinking water comes from downstream of the Niagara River,
would not sleep any easier if the proposal was adopted.
TERENCE G . ISON*
Microeconomic Concepts for Attorneys. BY WAYNE C. CURTIS. West-
port : Quorum Books. 1984 . Pp . xvi, 153 . ($29 .95)
Cynical lawyers may well take delight in classifying Oliver Wendell
Holmes' well-known assessment of the role of statistics and economic
analysis in law, predictions of the end of the world or the imminent
depletion of world oil resources, as some of the more gloriously inaccu-
rate and naive prophesies of recent generations . Indeed, anyone who has
experienced legal education during the last eighty-eight years may find it
hard to conceal a smile on recalling Justice Holmes' 1897 view : 1
For the rational study ofthe law the black-letter manmay be the man of the present,
but the man of the future is the man of the statistics and the master of economics .
17 See, e.g ., T.G . Ison, The Uses and Limitations of Sanctions in Industrial Health
and Safety, Item No . 158 (1975), 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 203: Decision No .
167 (1975), 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 234.
*Terence G. Ison, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University . Downsview,
Ontario .
1 The Path of the Law (1897), 10 Harvard L . Rev. 457, at p. 469.
